rajamesandJunie
a8b70e88d3
Source tree reorganization: - Move StarForth v3 engine to v3/ (src/, include/, Makefile) - Move kernel to kernel/ (src/, include/, linker/, Makefile) - Create v4/ skeleton for F18-ISA golden model (DECOMPOSITION.md, JUSTIFICATION.md) - Move FABRIC-0..4.md to docs/fabric/ - Move ONTOLOGY.md and ROADMAP.md to docs/ Board infrastructure: - Add boards/ser5/, boards/raspi/, boards/milkv/, boards/zynq7020/ - Each board has board.mk (ISA, CPU flags, boot recipe) and README.md - Root Makefile becomes thin dispatcher: boot_image, all, clean, docs take TARGET - make boot_image TARGET=SER5|RASPI|MILKV builds one GPT/MBR image per board - ZYNQ7020 target exists but stops with clear error (ARMv7 port not built yet) - scripts/mkdiskimage.sh builds disk images for all boards Docs pipeline: - docs/book/ with LaTeX master (main.tex) and Makefile - pandoc converts Markdown to LaTeX at build time - Two Lua filters: table-widths.lua (wide tables wrap), code-breaks.lua (inline code breaks) - make docs builds single PDF (754 pages, 0 missing characters) - make docs TARGET=<board> adds board appendix - build/docs/<book|board>/meta.tex stamps git commit into PDF Bug fixes: - 42 include paths that only worked by accident now use correct relative paths - clang-18 hardcode replaced with configurable CC variable (fixed aarch64 build) - Pi 5: kernel_2712.img linked at 0x80000, .bss zeroed, memory reserved - Doxyfile, .clang-tidy, README.md, Kconfig paths updated Verified: - Hosted v3 build passes 1012 tests, 0 failures - SER5 image boots in QEMU (OVMF), POST passes, K exact (65536 = Q48_ONE) - Milk-V image boots in QEMU (OpenSBI + U-Boot + bootefi), POST passes - make clean TARGET=<board> removes only that board and its ISA objects - make all builds all boards, hosted v3, and docs in one run Co-authored-by: Junie <junie@jetbrains.com>
48 lines
2.3 KiB
C
48 lines
2.3 KiB
C
/* ed25519.h -- EdDSA (RFC 8032), freestanding C99.
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*
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* Originally verify-only ("this kernel never signs; signing happens in
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* the host-side build tool") -- that was correct for capsule signing
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* (build-time, offline, a normal Linux binary can link libsodium/
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* OpenSSL) but conflicts with an on-device Zuse session minting new
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* user certs live at runtime, which requires the kernel itself to sign.
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* Decided (Phase 8, 2026-08-26): add real keygen/signing rather than
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* reshape that flow around verify-only. Entropy for keygen comes from
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* virtio_rng.h -- this header still has no RNG of its own, and takes a
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* caller-supplied seed rather than generating one, deliberately: keygen
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* has no business deciding how the seed's randomness quality is
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* guaranteed, that's the caller's job.
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*
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* Signing is NOT constant-time (same non-constant-time double-and-add
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* scalar_mult() verify already used) -- acceptable for this project's
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* actual threat model (an emulated/embedded kernel with no untrusted
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* co-tenant able to observe timing), not acceptable if this code is
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* ever reused somewhere with a real timing-attack surface.
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*/
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#ifndef ED25519_H
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#define ED25519_H
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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/* Returns 1 if signature (64 bytes: R || S) is a valid Ed25519 signature
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* by pubkey (32 bytes, compressed point) over msg, else 0. Rejects
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* malformed inputs (S >= L, an undecodable point) as invalid rather than
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* faulting. */
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int ed25519_verify(const uint8_t pubkey[32], const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
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const uint8_t sig[64]);
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/* Derive the public key (compressed point A = [a]B) from a 32-byte
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* seed. seed must be real, uniformly random entropy -- see this file's
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* header comment; ed25519_keygen() does not check or generate it. */
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void ed25519_keygen(const uint8_t seed[32], uint8_t pubkey_out[32]);
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/* Sign msg with the keypair derived from seed (the same seed passed to
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* ed25519_keygen() to obtain the matching public key). Deterministic
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* per RFC 8032 (the nonce is derived from seed + message, not fresh
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* randomness at sign time) -- only keygen needs real entropy, signing
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* needs none. */
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void ed25519_sign(const uint8_t seed[32], const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
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uint8_t sig_out[64]);
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#endif /* ED25519_H */
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